Origin:
Importance of Regional Self-help Mechanism
• 1997/98 crisis was the major event that led to extensive East Asian (EA) regional cooperation. ASEAN+3, many cooperation initiatives and more recently East Asian Summit. • Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea became insolvent (not enough reserves to meet their obligations) and had to enter IMF programs. Contagion to the whole region.
• At that time countries were viewing the adequacy of reserves with the wrong paradigm (current account paradigm/months of imports etc.). Need for reserves to also cover the huge amount of short-term foreign debt was not recognized.
Importance of Regional Self-help Mechanism (2)
• Region as a whole was a saving surplus region (about US$ 100 billion annually), but deficit countries had to rely on short-term foreign debt.
• Much discussion that if EA financial resources were better utilized prior to the crisis, then may be crisis could have been avoided. • In addition, frustration that region had very little role in the crisis resolution measures. These were mostly dictated by the IMF with inputs from the US Treasury and Federal Reserves behind the scene. • Very harsh and controversial conditionality (almost opposite to sub-prime crisis resolution measures).
Importance of Regional Self-help Mechanism (3)
• Critics pointed to a number of areas, such as: 1) stringent fiscal and monetary policies without regard for social/political consequences; one size fits all nature; 2) ignored non-market based interventions. Malaysia and Hong Kong used these types of measures successfully; 3) full guarantee for creditors (mostly foreign) of financial institutions; and, 4) imposition of rapid structural reform measures. "Fire sale" type of policies.
• Again, EA felt that with more inputs, resolution was possible with much less pain. • All these reasons were important push factors that brought the region together.
Chiang Mai Initiative 
Gross Official Foreign Reserves

Development (2)
• Apart from the reserves accumulation, better self insurance resulted from better understanding of the dangers of short-term debt (better paradigm). Better monitoring and control of short-term debt.
• More flexible exchange rate (particularly on the downward side) also contributed to better self protection. • However, in spite of better self protection, the momentum to evolve the CMI into something more effective remained. • Also, large reserves meant that the cost of using some reserves in a regional liquidity mechanism became less. 
Development (3)
Adequacy of Foreign Reserves
• Need to back up short-term contingent liabilities.
(1) 
Outlook:
Provision of Foreign Exchange Liquidity (3)
• In spite of these swaps and the CMI and CMIM links to the IMF, the region still pushed ahead with CMIM.
Likely from realization that a liquidity support mechanism in the form of a regional public good mechanism is the most effective option, both economically and politically. • While the US Federal Reserves is always in a position to provide US$ liquidity if it chooses to do so, it would be a major mistake to rely on such agreements in the future. The important point is that who the US chooses to give swap agreements to will be driven mainly by US interests, which may not coincide with the region's interests.
Provision of Foreign Exchange Liquidity (4)
• To make CMIM truly effective a number of steps are suggested.
• First is to de-link from the IMF, otherwise the CMIM is likely to be useless. • CMIM borrowing quota may not be enough (Thailand has borrowing quota of $ 11.925 billion for example). Should be possible to supplement CMIM by contributions from countries in the group. This is like IMF borrowing. E.g. Thai package of $ 17.2 billion only contained $ 4 billion from IMF, rest from country contributions. If this is allowed, then resources of CMIM will be more like $ 400-500 billion rather than $120 billion.
Provision of Foreign Exchange Liquidity (5)
• CMIM should also be able to provide swap facilities instead of just pure borrowing. This will make CMIM much more flexible.
• Should be expanded to include India, Australia and New Zealand. Best way might be to make these three countries "Contributing Partners", that is they will be able to make country contributions to specific lending programs in the future. In this way, they can be allowed to participate in all technical programs under the CMIM umbrella, such as surveillance and activities to support the integration of the region. This will not disrupt what has already been agreed upon and will also make ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 activities in the financial area more unified.
Provision of Foreign Exchange Liquidity (6)
• Most importantly the ISU must be set up. Need full time professional staff to operate and provide technical support to countries. This is going to be like a monetary organization for EA, but role will be much broader than just functioning like an IMF in East Asia. • For example, the Arab Monetary Fund has very broad objectives, including: 1) BOP corrections; 2) Develop current payments among members; 3) support Arab monetary cooperation; 4) advice on investment of members; 5) promote development of Arab financial markets; 6) paving way for single currency; and 7) promote trade among member states.
Provision of Foreign Exchange Liquidity (7)
• ISU will need time to develop expertise and gain credibility.
• Need close links to other regional bodies, such as ADB, ADBI and ASEAN Secretariat. Also to global IFI's. Even though CMIM lending should be delinked from the IMF, the IMF can play an important role in providing technical support and capacity building for the ISU.
• Financial support for ISU should come from pro-rata contributions from the ASEAN+3. For example 0.05% of the contributed amount per year (a tiny fraction of the interest earnings on these self-managed reserves) comes to US$ 60 million (initial amount could be much less).
Regional Surveillance Process
• Current surveillance process in the region not very effective. Limited resources to support the mechanisms, and the officials supporting these processes only carry out the tasks on a part time basis with many other regular jobs they have to do. Ministers Meeting also tended to be mostly rubber stamping what the officials have prepared through the Deputies Meetings. • Key to the success of any kind of surveillance mechanism within the region is to have a strong professional secretariat supporting the process. Thus, ISU can make a significant contribution by becoming the dedicated technical secretariat of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers process.
